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INTRODUCTION 
In any given situation there is a large amount of in-
formation available to an observer, not all of which is at-
tended to. Selective attention refers to the ability to 
selectively attend to some information and to "filter out" 
or not attend to other information. That information which 
is filtered out, or not attended to, is usually considered 
irrelevant by an observer, and consequently, is not pro-
cessed. This paper will discus that information which is 
not consciously attended to. Of major import will be the 
small portion of unattended information which is processed 
by an observer without effort or intent. 
The phenomenon of selective focusing on incoming infor-
mation with attention allotted only to information deemed 
relevant (and occasional processing of the unattended infor-
mation) is particularly evident in the case of auditory e-
vents. Consider the amount of incoming information one 
guest receives at a cocktail party, where many simultaneous 
conversations are occurring. Although that guest can hear 
quite a few different conversations, as they are all taking 
place in the same room, he is probably attending to only one 
- the conversation he is engaged in. Our guest is probably 
comprehending his conversation alone and is unaware of the 
content or messages that any of the surrounding conversations 
contain. Let his name be mentioned in one of the surrounding 
1 
conversations however, and he will suddenly become very 
aware of that seemingly unprocessed message! 
2 
Selective focusing also occurs in the case of visual 
events. When driving along a well traveled path one seems 
to do so almost automatically, and is virtually unaware of 
the pedestrians on the sidewalks or the cars driving in the 
opposite direction. If one of those pedestrians or drivers 
in the passing cars is someone close to the first driver, 
however, he will almost certainly notice that person - pick-
ing him out from an almost indistinguishable mass of seem-
ingly unprocessed information. 
The processing of information from an unattended source 
(e.g. background conversations or passing cars) is a rel-
atively infrequent event. The bulk of unattended infor-
mation is not processed by an observer, who is completely 
unaware bf its content. Only occasionally does some unat-
tended information become meaningful to an observer. Two 
explanations are usually offered to account for this phe-
nomenon. 
Units of information with low recognition thresholds 
(such as one's own name) are recognized very easily, even 
without conscious effort or intent. These units can thus 
be recognized even when present at an unattended source. 
Another current explanation of processing of unattended 
information is seen in the idea of automaticity of proces-
sing, which suggests that some information is recognized 
"automatically". According to this view, when an obser-
ver has enough practice with a stimulus word (enough prac-
tice recognizing something), he is able to recognize it 
without attention (i.e. conscious effort or intent), even 
when it is present at an unattended source. It should 
be noted that while these two explanations account for the 
same phenomena - the processing of unattended information, 
and that they overlap in that often low recognition thres-
J 
hold information is the same information that is said to be 
processed automatically, they are quite different as they 
postulate very different mental processes. 
While both low recognition threshold theory and auto-
matic processing theory are adequate explanations of the 
recognition of very familiar or very meaningful stimuli, it 
i 
is felt that if information is processed that is neither 
highly practiced nor highly meaningful, these theories might 
be deemed inadequate explanations. A series of studies will 
be conducted that will investigate the processing of unat-
tended visual information and the adequacy of current ex~ 
planations of such processing. A brief summary of the stud-
ies to be conducted and the logic behind them is presented 
below. 
It has been established that although subjects are 
generally unaware of unattended visual information, they 
will notice their own name if it is printed in the area of 
the unattended information. This series of studies will 
attempt to determine if any other information is processed 
when presented at an unattended source. At the level of 
attended information it has been found that subjects are 
able to remember information much more successfully if it 
can be clustered into one semantic category than if it is 
4 
a bulk of seemingly unrelated information. This study will 
investigate that sam~ effect at the level of unattended in-
formation (the amount of unattended information identified 
on a subsequent recognition test when all of the unattended 
information can be grouped into one semantic category will 
be compared to the subsequent recognition of unattended in-
formation when the information cannot be semantically group-
ed). It has also been found that, at the level of attended 
information, concrete stimuli are remembered much more suc-
cesfully than abstract stimuli. This effect will be inves-
tigated at the level of unattended information (subsequent 
recognition of concrete stimuli will be compared to the sub-
sequent recognition of abstract stimuli). Prev~ous research 
has shown that when subjects are asked to respond to one of 
two conflicting dimensions of a stimulus the response to the 
first dimension will interfere with the response to the sec-
ond dimension (this is called a Stroop type interference 
effect). This interference effect will be tested using un-
attended information - one dimension will be at the level 
of attended information and one at an unattended level. 
5 
It is felt that the results of these studies will dir-
ectly relate to the current explanations of processing of 
unattended information. If, when stimulus words are neither 
highly practiced nor highly meaningful (to the subjects), 
no interference of the types described above occurs, it 
would suggest that unattended information is processed only 
when it is highly practiced or highly meaningful (such as 
one's own name) and would thus support current explanations. 
If however, information is processed when it is neither 
highly practiced nor highly meaningful (as would be evidenc-
ed by the semantic processing of category information, a 
superiority effect for concrete over abstract stimuli or a 
Stroop type interference effect), it would clearly suggest 
a need to revise current explanations. 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This literature review will cover three major topics 
relevant to the evaluation of the current explanations of 
processing of unattended information. The first topic to be 
covered will be attention, specifically selective attention. 
Auditory information processing studies, Stroop effects, 
evidence for "automatic processing", and explanations of 
processing of unattended information will all be discussed. 
Following the discussion of attention will be presen-
tations of research related to clustering effects as seen in 
recall tests and the recall of concrete versus abstract 
stimuli. This literature is important as the recall of 
clustered (categorized) items and the recall of concrete 
versus abstract stimuli will later be tested at tne level of 
unattended information and compared to the recall patterns 
at the level of attended information. 
Attention 
Introduction. In 1890 William James wrote, "Everybody 
knows what attention is," and that without selective focus-
ing, "experience is utter chaos." Unfortunately however, 
the matter is not quite that simple. In 1890 everybody did 
not know what attention was, and almost 100 years later, we 
still don't! The subject of attention is a very broad one. 
6 
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The are many different definitions of it, models describing 
it, and subcategories within it. Posner and Boies (1971) 
suggested that there are three major topics or categories 
under which studies of attention might be grouped. The 
first was the notion of alertness. Maintaining attention in 
the sense of alertness refers to the ability to perform 
long, boring tasks without letting attention drift. A sec-
ond category of attention was defined as selectivity, the 
ability to select information from one source or kind over 
other possible sources or kinds. The third topic of atten-
tion was defined as processing capacity, the limit on man's 
ability to perform simultaneous mental operations. 
These three topics of attention encompass a great deal 
of research, but demonstrate one very general principle 
which is the foundation of most major theories of attention 
(Kahneman, 1973; Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Posner & Snyder 
1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider 
1977): The conceptualization that attention is a very lim-
ited natural resource. We are unable to attend to some-
thing for an unlimited amount of time, or to attend to an 
unlimited amount of things. The more complex (difficult) 
a task, the more attention it requires. While we are able 
to walk and talk at the same time, it is very difficult to 
perform two less practiced tasks simultaneously, such as 
reading a difficult book and delivering a lecture. If the 
8 
difficulty of a task varies, the attentional allotment will 
also vary. learning to drive is a very difficult task and 
takes the full concentration of a new driver - he or she 
probably has trouble talking while driving. After becom-
ing practiced however, many people are able to carry on a 
lively conversation while driving a car, although if a dif-
ficult turn must be negotiated, conversation may temporar-
ily stop while the driver concentrates on that turn (Kah-
neman, 1973). 
This paper will investigate aspects of Posner and Bo-
ies' second category, selective attention. Everyday exper-
ience tells us that we attend to some environmental stimuli 
more than others and that the unatte~ded stimuli often pass 
unnoticed. While we are normally aware of all attended in-
formation, the bulk of the unattended information is us-
ually never processed, we are neither able to recognize un-
attended information, nor recall it. When reading an inter-
esting book or engrossed in a conversation, we are often un-
aware of a radio playing in the background, unable to iden-
tify the last few songs played. Only occasionally do we 
become aware of the content of unattended information. 
Auditory information processing studies have provided 
evidence for selective attention and the occasional pro-
cessing of unattended information. These studies will be 
discussed in the next section of this paper. Following 
9 
that will be a discussion of the Stroop effect, which pro-
vides evidence for the processing of unattended visual in-
formation. This chapter on attention will then be directed 
to the presentation of some very recent selective attention 
research and a discussion of the concept of automatic pro-
cessing, and finally, conclude with a discussion of current 
explanations of processing of unattended information. 
Auditory information processing research: Evidence 
for selective attention. Much work on selective attention 
has used the auditory modality. The advantages of this mod-
ality are clear: Auditory attention can be studied with-
out the encumbrance of orientation movements which domin-
ate visual attention (Broadbent, 1958), audition can be 
characterized by two distinct and obvious channels (Kahne-
man, 1973), and there is no physical mechanism for selective 
attention in audition while there is an excellent one in 
vision, namely, looking away (Wolford & Morrison, 1980). 
Research by Cherry (1953) led to the development of 
an experimental procedure called shadowing which is instru-
mental in studying unattended information. In that tech-
nique a subject is asked to follow a spoken message, re-
peating every word, and ignore other messages to which he 
is simultaneously exposed. It was found that the presence 
of a distracting message barely impaired shadowing perfor-
mance when the rejected and attended messages were seper-
10 
ated by an obvious physical characteristic, such as spatial 
origin (i.e. a different message presented to each ear). 
It was also found that subjects were always aware of the 
presence of the rejected message at the unattended ear, 
but could recall virtually none of its content or even the 
language in which it was spoken. Subjects were only aware 
of gross units of information in the unattended channel, 
such as the sex of the voice delivering the message, and 
could only detect major physical changes, such as a change 
of voice or a switch from a voice to a tone. 
An early theory of attention was developed by Broadbent 
(1958). This theory can be classified as a filter theory 
and was based on the idea that information processing is re-
stricted by channel capacity.· Briefly, Broadbent postulated 
a sequence of three processes: A short term store (S-sys-
tem), a selective filter, and a limi~ed capacity channel 
(P-system). Concurrent stimuli enter into the S-system in 
parallel and are analyzed there for physical features such 
as location or tone. There is no definite limit on the cap-
acity of the S-system. The selective filter allows relev-
ant stimuli to enter the P-system for further processing. 
Filter theory interprets selective attention as setting the 
filter to select a certain class of stimuli and to reject 
all others. Irrelevant messages are simply allowed to decay 
in the S-system without undergoing more advanced processing 
11 
in the P-system. Filter theory implies that attention can-
not be divided, as the P-system performs no parallel pro-
cessing of discrete stimuli. According to this theory, the 
apparent division of attention in the performance of simul-
taneous activities can be explained by alternation between 
channels or between acts. 
Intuitively, the filter theory seems correct. It is 
obvious that we have a limited processing capacity and we 
do sometimes "switch" attention (e.g. stopping a conver-
sation in order to negotiate a difficult turn while driv-
ing). An early experiment using the dichotic listening 
technique supported this theory (Broadbent, 1954). Broad-
bent presented three digits to one ear of his subjects, 
and simultaneously, presented three different digits to 
the other ear. He found that the subjects could report the 
digits as they were presented to each ear much more suc-
cessfully than they could report the digits as they were 
presented temporally (if the digits 6, J, 9 were presented 
to the left ear and the digits 5, 8, 7 were presented to 
the right ear, subjects were able to report them in that 
order much more successfully than in correct temporal or-
der which would have 6,5 J,8 9,7). Broadbent interpreted 
this difference to be the result of having to switch at-
tention between sources (chal'1.nels) more often in the case 
of temporal report. 
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These results, along with Cherry's earlier results 
support the view that only one signal (message) can be pro-
cessed at one time, and provided the foundation for Broad-
bent's theory. Later studies have shown that Broadbent's 
filter theory was incorrect, however. 
Although Cherry (1953) showed that, as a rule, sub-
jects were unaware of the content of the unattended message 
when performing a sr.~dowing task, Moray (1959) was able to 
show that there are exceptions to that rule. Using a para-
digm similar to Cherry's, it was shown that although sub-
jects were generally unaware of the unattended message (the 
message they did not shadow), they did notice the pyesence 
of their own name within that message. Broadbent's filter 
theory does not account for this phenomena. 
Two experiments conducted by Gray and Wedderburn (1960) 
further challenged Broadbent's theory. Using a paradigm 
similar to Broadbent's (1954) they presented to alternate 
ears the syllables composing a word (in sequence) and ran-
dom digits; when a syllable was presented to one ear, a 
digit was presented to the other simultaneously. For ex-
ample, they presented OB, 2, TIVE to the left ear of a sub-
ject and 8, JEC, J to the right ear, with OB 8, JEC 2, and 
TIVE J occuring simultaneously. If Broadbent's theory were 
correct, subjects would have found it easier to report the 
stimuli ear by ear, such as OB-2-TIVE or 8-JEC-J. This was 
lJ 
not the case: Subjects would report OBJECTIVE, 8,2,J. 
In a second experiment Gray and Wedderburn used the same 
procedure but presented phrases and digits simultaneously, 
such as MICE-2-CHEESE to one ear, and 8-EAT-9 to the other 
(with the pairs MICE-8, 2-EAT, and CHEESE-9 each occurring 
simultaneously). As in the fractured word experiment, sub-
jects grouped the message segments by meaning rather than 
by channel. 
Treisman (1960) looked at another situation in which 
subjects were instructed to shadow a particular ear. The 
message in the to-be-shadowed ear was meaningful until a 
certain point, at which time it turned into a random se-
quence of words (such as, I SAW THE GIRL song was wishing). 
Simultaneously, the meaningful message switched to the other 
ear, which had previously been a random sequence of words 
(such as, me that bird JUMPING IN THE STREET). Many sub-
jects switched ears, against instructions, and continued 
to follow the meaningful message (that is, the shadowed 
message they would report would be, "I SAW THE GIRL JT.JIVIPING 
IN THE STREET"). 
Although Broadbent's filter theory and early research 
showed that very little was known about the unattended mes-
sage and suggested that subjects simply "turned one ear off" 
the above studies showed that this was not the case and 
that there are times when the unattended message is pro-
14 
cessed and becomes meaningful. In an attempt to accomodate 
the evidence against filter theory, Treisman (1960, 1964) 
proposed a modification of that theory that described fil-
tering as a relative process: The rejected message was 
attenuated, not eradicated. 
According to Treisman, a sensory message activates hy-
pothetical "dictionary units" in memory. Each unit has a 
threshold which must be exceeded for perception to occur. 
The threshold for highly significant stimuli, such as one's 
name, is very low. Because of the variation of thresholds, 
a wo~d presented in an irrelevant charillel may be perceived 
in spite of attenuation, which would explain Moray's (1959) 
name effect. Thresholds can be temporarilly lowered, ac-
cording to Treisman, when an external context makes the oc-
curance of a given word highly probable, which would ex-
plain Gray and Wedderburn's (1960) and Treisman's (1960) 
results. 
In a major departure from filter theory, T~eisman con-
cluded that divided attention and parallel processing are 
possible for two simultaneous inputs, but only if they do 
not reach the same analyzers; serial processing must occur 
when the same analyzer is used. Treisman's model suggests 
that: a) perception is contingent upon recognition thres-
holds, which are variable, b) parallel processing can occur, 
but only when different analyzers are used, and c) "irrel-
15 
evant messages" fall on a dull not a deaf ear. This model 
will be discussed in greater detail in a later section of 
this chapter. 
Stroop effects. A Stroop type interference occurs 
when a subject is asked to respond to one of two dimensions 
of a given stimulus and the second dimension delays or in-
terferes with that response. Traditional Stroop stimuli are 
color words printed in an ink color that is inconsistent 
with the meaning of the word. Interference occurs when a 
subject is asked to respond to the color of the ink. The 
printed word interferes with his response and he will char-
acteristically respond faster to patches of color than he 
will if it is in the form of a printed color word that sig-
nifies a color other than that of the ink. 
The origins of the Stroop test go back almost to the 
beginning of experimental psycholo!gy. In 1883, Wilhelm 
v1fund t is said to have suggested to one of his students, 
James Cattell, that he do his doctoral research on the time 
it takes to name colors and objects and to read the cor-
responding words (Jensen & Rohwer, 1966). The conflict or 
interference situation, which is the main feature of the 
Stroop effect was first discussed by Jaensch (1929, cited 
by Jensen & Rohwer, 1966) in connection with his research 
on perceptual types. The color-word interference test was 
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first introduced by John rtidley Stroop. Stroop's doctoral 
thesis was concerned with serial verbal reactions and used 
the color-word interference test now associated with his 
name (Stroop, l9J5). 
The original Stroop test consisted of three cards: 
A word card with the names of colors printed in black ink 
(W), a color card with rows of patches of colors (C), and 
a color word card with rows of color names printed in ink 
of a conflicting color (CW). Red, green, blue, brown, and 
purple were used. The words and colors were arranged in a 
10 x 10 matrix of evenly spaced rows and columns. Any reg-
ularity of sequence (horizontally or vertically) was avoid-
ed. Each of the five colors or words occurred twice in 
each column and each row, and no attribute was immediately 
adjacent to itself in either column or row. Subjects were 
instructed to verbally report either the colors or the words 
reading from left to right, starting with the top row, and 
to respond as rapidly as possible while trying to be as 
accurate as possible. 
Within the format of reporting a series of words or 
colors the basic data are the total time needed to name 
the stimuli (colors or words) for each card. This format 
has been very successful in the production of interference. 
There is a color-word interference, or conflict, exper-
ienced when the subject is asked to name the color of the 
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lettering of the incongruous CW card. This effect is quite 
robust and is exhibited over a wide range of phenomena. For 
example, Stroop like interference has been found not only 
for naming colors in the presence of color words, but in 
the presence of other words (Klein, 1964; Warren, 1972), in 
the naming of achromatic shades (Dyer, 1971a), in naming 
four positions of a compass when the positions are labeled 
with incongruent direction names (White, 1969), in naming 
directions specified by arrows when the arrows are labeled 
with conflicting direction names (Shor, 1970), in naming 
words above or below a fixation point when the positions 
are labeled with conflicting position names (Logan & Zbro-
qoff, 1979; Seymour, 197J), and with different preexposure 
times to a color word (Dyer, 1971b). 
Studies alluded to above have used stimuli such as 
arrows, compass points, and "above" or ':below" position 
l . . 
judgements. It appears that in order to be correctly called 
a Stroop task the stimuli used must meet two criteria: 
Stimuli must be constructed in such a way that subjects can 
be asked to respond to one dimension of a two dimensional 
stimulus, and within those two dimensions one must repre-
sent an attribute or concept and one must represent an at-
tribute name. 
Varied explanations of the Stroop effect have been of-
fe~ed, many of which hinge on the finding by Fraisse (1969) 
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that reading is faster than naming. From that finding it 
is assumed that verbal information is processed faster than 
non-verbal information (the attribute name is processed 
faster than the attribute itself) and thus, the verbal in-
formation interferes with the non-verbal information. This 
position was refined by Palef and Olson (1975). They con-
tend that the verbal versus non-verbal information is not im-
portant per se, but rather the relative speeds at which 
the two forms of information (dimensions) are processed. 
They postulated that interference results _when the response 
is required to the slower of the two processing modes (the 
non-verbal dimension in the color-word stimuli). 
Hintzman, Carre, Eskridge, Owens, Shaff and Sparks 
(1972) felt that the effect is not caused by interference 
but-by response competition. They argued that if the effect 
were due to interference at the time of encoding, any prin-
ted word (attribute name) would interfere with the encoding 
of the color (attribute). This is simply not so. Klein 
( 1964) has shov!Y1. that although all words will affect the pro-
cessing of a color stimulus, different attributes of words 
will differentially affect the color naming responses. A 
standard Stroop type experiment was conducted which inves-
tigated the interference effects of verbal stimuli varying 
in their'relationship to the ink colors. Six conditions 
were used. In each condition the verbal stimuli consisted 
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of items typed in the colors rec, green, yellow, and blue. 
In Condition A all verbal items were nonsense syllables 
(hjh, eugic, bdhr); in Condition B they were rare English 
words (sol, helot, eft, abjure); in Condition C they were 
common English words not closely associated with colors 
(put, take, friend); in Condition D they were words which 
were not color names but which implicated colors in their 
meaning (lemon, grass, sky) and were presented irc incon-
~ruent combinations with the ink colors; ir. ConditionE 0 
they were different words of the same response class as 
the ink colors (tan, purple, black). Condition F was the 
standard Stroou Condition, the words reuresented the color ~ ~ 
names but were presented in incongruent combinations of 
color and word. Results showed that in all conditions re-
sponses were significantly slower for the conflict-stimuli 
than for the colors-alone stimuli. As the words became more 
meaningful and more closely related to colors the inter-
ference increments became increasingly larger. It was con-
eluded that the impeding effect of the verbal stimul~ upon 
the relevant color naming response is governed by ~he rel-
a~ive meaningfulness of the words (with respect to the cor-
rect response). Many studies have shown that when an at-
tribute and attribute name are consistent the interference 
effect does not occur (Dyer, 1971b; Hintzman et. al., 1972; 
Ridley, Johnson & Braisted, 1978). If the interference be-
tween two modes were occurring, one dimension would inter-
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fere with the other dimension (as seen in resuonse laten-
cies) regardless of whether or not the two dimensions rep-
resented consistent information. Hintzmen et. al. felt 
that the delay exhibited with an interference effect of 
this sort represents response competition and that the con-
sistency effect occurs because there is no competition when 
the two dimensions (responses) are the same. 
Hintzman (1978) later revised his uosition and stated 
that the Stroop effect shows that encoding is automatic, 
or effortless, that we cannot turn off the retrieval of 
highly familiar information even if we want to, and that be-
cause interference is selective (different words produce 
different levels of interference), it is probably the mean-
ings of the words that are being retrieved. Hasher and 
Zacks (1979) use the Stroop effect to demonstrate the auto-
maticity of learning. They feel that the word meanings are 
automatically activated and explain the effect by stating 
that the difficulty in reading the ink colors comes from 
the interfering reading responses made to the incongruent 
color words. 
It is this assumption that the meanings of the prin-
ted words are encoded "automatically" that is relevant to 
the current discussion. That some information cannot be 
ignored (that subjects cannot selectively attend to some 
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information), but will be processed automatically, without 
effort or intent, is a very iwportant finding with respect 
to selective attention. The idea of "automatic processing" 
may be very important to the discussion of processing of 
unattended information and will be further discussed below. 
Recent evidence for processing unattended visual in-
formation: Automatic processing. Although the majority 
of the research on selective attention has been concerned 
with the auditory modality (probably due to the conven-
iences discussed earlier) some studies have also utilized 
the visual modality. In addition to the research dealing 
with Stroop phenomena discussed above, some studies have 
been classified as d.ealing with Stroop like phenomena, that 
is, studies similar to the Stroop studies, but that do not 
meet the criteria for a true Stroop test. 
One such article, dealing with the precedence of glo-
bal dimensions in visual perception, is that of Navon (1977). 
Navon proposed that perception proceeds from a general, 
global analysis to a more and more specific, local analysis, 
and that his findings demonstrated the "inevitability of 
global processing". These claims were based·o:r.. ti1e results 
of an experiment in which he used sti..'11uli composed of let-
ters made up of smaller letters, as shown in Figure 1. 
These stimuli, as originally suggested by Kinchla (1974), 
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Figure 1. Stimulus set used by Navon ( 1977) . 
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were used such that the identified properties of the global 
and local dimensions could be equated (i.e. the set of 
identified global features - the large letter, was iden-
tical to the set of identified local features - the small 
letters). 
Subjects were shown the stimuli described above under 
two different conditions. In the global directed condition 
the subject was asked to indicate whether the global char-
acter (the large letter) was an Horan S. In the local 
directed condition the subject was asked to indicate whether 
the local characters (the small letters making up the large 
one) were Hs or Ss. The results indicated that the global 
pattern was responded to faster than the local characters, 
and more importantly, subjects were able to voluntarily 
attend to the global dimension without being affected by 
the local dimension, put they were not able to attend to 
' 
the local dimension without being affected by the global 
dimension (i.e. under the global directed condition it 
made no difference whether the two levels of structure were 
consistent or conflicting; under the local directed con-
dition consistent stimuli were responded to more rapidly 
than were conflicting stimuli). Navon's results are shown 
in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Mean response latencies as a function of 




in Navon's study was perhaps not surprising. There is ev-
idence (Lupp, Hauske & Wolfe, 1976) that subjects respond 
rapidly to low spatial frequencies and progressively more 
slowly to higher frequencies, which in itself would pre-
dict Navon's findings. There is also considerable evi-
dence that single letters are easier to perceive than let-
ters flanked by other letters (Townsend, Taylor & Brown, 
1971; Wolford & Hollingsworth, 1974). This phenomenon is 
called a lateralmasking effect and would appear in Navon's 
stimulus set only on the local level, which also may have 
made letters within the local level more difficult to per-
ceive. What is surprising, however, was the finding that 
the local dimensions did not interfere with the processing 
of the global dimensions, while the global dimensions did 
interfere with the processing of the local dimensions. It 
was this finding that led Navon to conclude that processing 
on the global level was inevitable; it seemed that subjects 
had to process the large (global) letter first in both con-
ditions. 
In response to Navon's results, Kinchla and Wolfe 
(1979) again addressed the problem of the order of visual 
processing. The stimuli used were similar to those used 
by Navon, however, the overall size of the stimuli was var-
ied over a much larger range of visual angle. Navon pre-
sented stimuli at a visual angle of approximately J 0 12'; 
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Kinchla and Wolfe presented stimuli in which the height of 
the large letter subtended, with equal probability on each 
trial. 4.8°, 6.7°, 8.0°, 10.J0 , or 22.1° visual angle. Sub-
jects heard a target letter defined and were then shown a 
stimulus letter. Their task was to respone "yes" if the 
target letter corresponded to either the large letter or 
the small letters in the stimulus letter and "no" if it did 
not. It was found that "no" responses generally took long-
er than "yes" responses ar.d that there was a crossover in-
teraction between the speed of a "yes" response to large 
and small targets 'and the visual angle of the display, as 
shown in Figure J. At smaller visual angles the large let-
ter evoked the fastest "yes", while at the larger visual 
angles the small letters did. These results suggested nei-
ther an invariant global to local process (which Navon had 
proposed as inevitable) nor an invariant local to global 
process (as a feature analytic model would predict). 
Another series of studies was conducted by Martin 
(1979), again in direct response to Navon's findings. Mar-
tin used stimuli similar to those used by Navon, letters 
made up of smaller letters. As in Navon's study, stimuli 
were presented in one of four possible quadrants of the 
stimulus field, immediately adjacent to the field's cen-
tral and vertical axes. The global shape subtended 2.~0 
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Figure J. The average time to respond "yes" at each ang-
ular display size when a large letter was the 
target, when small letters were the targets, 
and to respond "no" when neither was the tar-
get (Kinchla & Wolfe, 1979). 
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4.1°above or below it. Her research addressed two ass~~p-
tions: The first was that global processing preceeds lee-
al processing, and the second was that when two conflicting 
types of information are processed, perception of a sec-
ondary (more slowly available) type is impaired by the pri-
mary type. 
In Martin's main experiment, subjects were shown a 
global letter composed of several smaller, local letters. 
The sparsity of each stimulus was varied by having each 
global aspect be comprised of either many or few local ones, 
such that the global to local size ratio was varied. The 
task of the subject was to iden~ify either the global or 
local letters (as instructed) as rapidly as possible. 
A two way interaction between sparsity and attentional 
instructions was found. Depending upon conditions, either 
the global aspects or the local aspects of the stimuli were 
responced to more rapidly, as shown in Figure 4. Although 
global processing was significantly faster than local pro-
cessing for stimuli with many local elements, it was sig-
nificantly slower than local processing for stimuli with 
. 
few local elements. The results of her series of four ex-
periments consistently demonstrated a global processing 
priority only for many-element stimuli, a local processing 
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Figure 4. Latencies for reporting local and global aspects 
of many element and few element stimuli, as a 
function of the level of consistency of the sec-
ondary aspect (Martin, 1979). 
Hoffman's (1980) research also investigated the pro-
cessing of levels of structure, utilizing a paradigm that 
combined elements of Navon's (1977) interference paradigm 
and Kinchla and Wolfe's (1979) target search task. Each 
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of his trials began with the presentation of a memory set 
of one, -two, or four letters. A stimulus pattern was then 
presented consisting of a large letter made up of smaller 
letters. A letter was considered positive if it was a mem-
ber of the memory set and negative if it was not. The ex-
periment was divided into a "large only" condition in which 
the target letter might appear at the global level, a 
"small only" condition in which the target letter might ap-
pear at the local level, and a "both" condition in which 
the target letter might appear at either level. In one 
experiment (using the letters L,X,T,Y,H,N,F, and Z), it was 
found that in the focused attention conditions subjects 
were unable to attend to only the instructed dimension. Re-
action times were faster when the two dimensions (large and 
small letters) were in agreement than when they conflicted, 
and the magnitude of the interference provided by the to-
be-ignored dimension was approximately the same in both the 
global directed and the local directed conditions. In the 
divided attention, or "both" condition, reaction time was 
the same for targets located at either the global or local 
level, and generally slower than for the corresponding foc-
used attention condition. 
Jl 
In a second experiment Hoffman distorted the quality 
of information at the local and/or global levels by changing 
the position of a randomly chosen element of a letter (at 
the appropriate global or local level) from its correct pos-
ition to a new randomly chosen position within the letter 
matrix. An example of Hoffman's stimuli is shown in Figure 
5. When the small letter was distorted, a global precedence 
nattern was obtained: Subjects could not ignore the large 
letter when told to attend only to the small, and the iden-
tity of the small letter was irrelevant when subjects were 
attending to the large letter. It is important to note that 
these results are in accordance with those which would be 
predicted by Navon's precedence model. When the large let-
ter was distorted however, a corresponding local precedence 
pattern was obtained, implying that both the large letters 
and the small letters were proceeding through a pattern rec-
ognition process sirnultaneohsly, and that the relative qual-
ity of information at each level determines the speed of 
.+. recognlulon. 
The results of the Stroop studies mentioned earlier 
and Navon's work mentioned above suggest that some pro-
cessing is so automatic that it cannot be ignored: Subjects 
cannot attend to an instructed dimension of a stimulus if 
another available dimension is one which is processed auto-
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always processed automatically, in an invarient maw~er. 
Later work (Hoffamn, 1980; Kinchla & Wolfe, 1979; Martin, 
1979) has shown that the ease (automaticity) of processing 
of different dimensions is variable, and contingent upon 
the quality of information available at those different 
dimensions. 
In a more direct investigation of unattended visual 
information Neisser (Note 1) demonstrated what he called 
selective reading. Subjects were presented with text in 
which the lines were printed in alternate colors. Subjects 
were instructed to selectively attend to half of the mater-
ial, that is, they were instructed to read the text printed 
in one color and to ignore the text printed in the other 
color. For the most part, subjects were unaware of the un-
attended information (the lines of text which they were not 
instructed to read). They were aware of highly familiar 
items however, such as their own names. 
Although the above study was considered a visual an-
alog to the auditory selective attention studies discussed 
earlier, it has been argued that the results may have been 
seriously confounded, due to the fact that the unattended 
visual information was located somewhere in the periphery 
of the retina. Recognition of the unattended material 
may have been inferior to that of the attended material 
simply because the attended information was located at the 
J4 
subject's fovea (where acuity is quite high) while the un-
attended information was located in the periphery (where 
acuity is deficient) . 1 
In an effort to account for this rather serious con-
found, v1Jolford and Morrison ( 1980) designed a new paradigm 
in order to study the processing of unattended visual in-
formation. A pair of digits vvas presented to subjects on 
the face of a CRT seperated by five degrees of visual angle, 
with a word centered between the two digits. Subjects were 
instructed to judge whether the two digits were of the same 
parity (both odd or both even) or of different parity (one 
odd and one even) and to ignore the centered word. It 
was found that no processing capacity was used to moniter 
the centered word (response latencies were the same with 
or without a centered word, as shown in Figure 6). Although 
subjects were generally unaware of the centered words and 
performance was at chance level on a subsequent two alter-
naternative forced choice recognition test, they were aware 
of a highly salient centered word, such as their ovm name, 
and performance was well above chance level on the sub-
sequent recognition test. 
As mentioned earlier, an explanation which would ac-
count for this phenomena is the concept of automatic pro-
1 It has been shoV~m that visual acuity is superior for 
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Figure 6. Response latencies as a function of block and 
experimental group (Wolford & ~orrison, 1980). 
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cessing. It is contended that some material is processed 
so often that it becomes increasingly practiced and familiar 
until that information is processed automatically, without 
effort or intent (e.g. one's own name). 
In an experiment in which subjects were instructed to 
write dictated words while reading it was shown that sub-
jects became increasingly more efficient at this task 
(Hirst, Spelke, Caharack & Neisser, 1980). The results 
were interpreted such that it was shown that attention is 
a skill that improves with practice: While at first sub-
jects found reading and writing (simultaneously) very dif-
ficult, with practice the task became very easy. The more 
a task has become practiced, the less attention it requires; 
highly practiced processes require no attention (capacity) 
at all. Such highly practiced processes are referred to as 
automatic (Anderson, 1980). Automatic processes are said 
to operate continually. They do not require awareness or 
intention and drain minimal amounts of energy from atten-
tional capacity (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). 
A comparison of recognition threshold and automaticity 
explanations of processing unattended information. As 
mentioned earlier, in an effort to accomodate results which 
suggested that unattended information is sometimes proces-
sed (Gray & Wedderburn, 1960; Moray, 1959; Treisman, 1960, 
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1964) an attenuation model of selective attention has been 
proposed (Treisman, 1960, 1964). It was suggested that all 
incoming stimuli activate hypothetical "dictionary units" 
that have thresholds that must be exceeded for perception 
to occur. The thresholds for highly significant stimuli, 
such as one's own name, are permanently low, while the 
threshold for a stimulus that context makes highly prob-
able is temporarily lowered. Because of these variations 
of thresholds, a stimulus of high significance or high pro-
bability that is presented in an unattended channel can be 
perceived. The posited threshold mechanism is described as 
follows: 
It may be that the channel filter attenuates messages 
rather than blocks them completely. If so, ~ords which 
were highly important or relevant to the subject could 
be picked out when the threshold for identifying them 
was permanently or temporarily lowered within the word-
identification system itself, in spite of their re-
duced signal-to-noise ratio. A possible system for 
identifying words is a hierarchy of tests carried out 
in sequence and giving a unique outcome for each word 
or other linguistic unit. The decision at each test 
point could be thought of as a signal detection pro-
blem: A certain ad~ustable cut off or criterion point 
is adopted on the word being discriminated, above which 
signals are accepted and below which signals are re-
jected as noise. The criterion determining there-
sults of the test would be made more liberal for cer-
tain outcomes favored by context and probabilities, 
by recent use, or by importance. Messages attenuated 
by the filter would pass the test only if the criterion 
had been lowered in their favor and, if not, would 
pass no further through the hierarchy. (p. 14, 1964) 
In a recent set of articles, Schneider and Shriffin 
JB 
(1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) distinguished be-
tween automatic and controlled processes in human informat-
ion processing. Automatic processing was defined as the 
activation of a learned sequence of elements in long term 
memory initiated by appropriate inputs. This activation 
proceeds automatically, without subject control, without 
any capacity allotments, and without demanding attention. 
Controlled processing was defined as an activation of a 
sequence of elements that requires attention, is capacity 
limited, and is controlled by the subject. In a series 
of studies the ways in which subjects scan visual arrays 
and the role of automaticity in that activity were inves-
tigated. 
Subjects were given a target letter or number·and were 
instructed to scan a series of visual displays for that 
character. The display consisted of 20 different frames 
flashed on a screen. Subjects were to report if their tar-
get occurred in one of those frames. Two factors were var-
ied: The frame size (each frame had one, two, or four char-
acters on it), and the relationship between the target items 
and the search items (in the same-category condition, both 
the target and the search characters were either letters or 
numbers; in the different-category condition, the target 
was a number and the search characters were letters). Per-
formance was dramatically different between between the 
J9 
different- and same-category conditions. In the different-
category condition, frame size had no effect, but in the 
same category condition performance changed dramatically 
as a function of frame size (as frame size increased, per-
formance decreased). 
Schneider and Shriffrin argued that subjects were so 
practiced at detecting a number amoung letters (before the 
start of the experiment - due to everyday experience) that 
this process was automatic. In contrast, when subjects had 
to distinguish a letter from other letters a more effortful 
process was required. To support this view, another exper-
iment was conducted in which the target letter was always 
from one set of letters (B,C,D,F,G,H,J,K,L) and the search 
letters were always from another set of letters (Q,R,S,T,V, 
W,X,Y,Z). After 2,100 trials, subjects were at the same 
level of performance as in the different-category condition 
of the previous experiment. Subjects needed extensive prac-
tice, but eventually became as efficient in this condition 
as in the letter/number search condition, implying that 
automatic processing follows consistent mapping of stimuli 
to responses (practice). 
As a result of these findings, Schneider and Shiffrin 
proposed that in novel situations or situations requiring 
moment to moment decisions, controlled processes are used 
in order to perform accurately, if slowly. As situations 
become familiar, always requiring the sa~e sequences of 
processing operations, automatic processing develops -
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such that attention demands are eased and control processes 
can be carried out in parallel. When stimuli are presented 
to be processed that do not cause automatic attention re-
sponses, a controlled attention response begins. In the 
case of selective attention, the processing organism car-
ries on attention demanding controlled processing on the at-
tended message, with only minimal controlled processing of 
the unattended information - just enough to establish 
which information is to be given deeper processing. If 
automatic attention responses have been attached to stimuli, 
these s~1muli will be processed and remembered even when 
they are present at an unattended source of information (or 
an ignored channel). 
While the two aforementioned theories (namely, those 
of low recognition threshold processing and automatic pro-
cessing of information) suggest very different processing 
systems, it should be noted that both theories account 
for "effortless" processing of the same material. The at-
tenuation model (low recognition threshold theory) holds 
that highly familiar or highly meaningful material is pro~ 
cessed even with a very small attentional allotment due to 
low recognition thresholds for that material. Automatic 
processing theory holds that highly familiar material is 
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processed even with a very small attentional allotment due 
to a practiced response pattern. In both cases it is very 
familiar material (such as one's own name) that is pro-
cessed easily or effortlessly (i.e. processed even when 
that information is present at an unattended source or 
channel). To this degree, both theories are very sim-
ilar; 2 both accounting for the same phenomena. Accord-
ingly, the adequacy of both theories can be examined simul-
taneously (with respect to this particular aspect of the 
theories), as they will be in the following series of ex-
periments. 
Clustering effects. 
In a free recall task, subjects view (or hear) a list 
of words and then attempt to recall them. The form the re-
call takes suggest ways in which information is organized 
by the subjects. A very general fact about free recall 
is that although there are no restrictions on recall order, 
2rt should be noted that the attenuation th~or~ ~lso 
accounts for some effortless processing of less ~amlllar 
material, in the case when a given situation makes.the pro~ 
bability of occurance of ~hat material unusua~ly hlgh .. Thls 
phenomena is not accounted for in the automatlc processlng 
theory. This situation is not considered in the uresent 
body of research however, and thus will not be di~cussed 
here. The following series of studies will investigate the 
processing of unattended single words and will not offer at-
tended contextual conditions which might affect the pro-
bability of occurrance of any given single word. 
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the actual order in which the items are recalled reflects 
some order. Bousfield (195J) was the first to demonstrate 
this. He presented a list of 60 nouns to subjects which 
fell into four categories: Animals (such as, giraffe, 
chipmunk, camel), male names (such as, Gerald, Owen, Si-
mon), professiohs (such as, milkman, chemist, dancer), 
and vegetables (such as, parsnip, spinich, mushroom). 
Although the presentation of the words was in a random or-
der, the recall was not. Subjects tended to recall items 
from the same categories together - a practice Bousfield 
termed "clustering". If recall were random, it would be 
expected that a word would be followed by another word from 
the same category 25% of the time; this happened 40% of 
the time however, too often to be attributed to chance. 
In response to Bousfield's study, Cohen (196), 1966) 
conducted a series of studies investigating the effect of 
categorization on word recall. Two types of categories 
were examined: Exhaustive and non-exhaustive. Exhaustive 
categories were ones in which three or four words repre-
sented all the words in that category (such as, North, 
South, East, West). Non-exhaustive categories were ones 
which contained a large number of items, only a few of 
which were used in the experiment (such as, dog, lion, 
horse). The results indicated that the words were cate~or-
o 
ized by the subjects and that this increased recall. More-
over, recall was greater for words in exhaustive cate-
gories than in non-exhaustive categories. 
In an experiment conducted by Bower, Clark, Lesgold 
4J 
and Winzenz (1969), the organizational variables in recall 
were investigated. Several conceptual hierarchies were con-
structed. An example of a conceptual hierarchy for the word 
"minerals" is shown in Figure 7. The list of to-be-re-
called items contained both members of a category and the 
category label itself. The presence of the category name 
was assumed to serve as a potent retrieval cue if the sub-
jects used the category name as an encoding tool. The word 
list included nested categories (such as "metals"), such 
that a high level category might serve as a superordinate 
for lower level instances. Words were presented all a~ 
once for prolonged study (rather than presenting the words 
one at a time for a brief duration). Subjects who had ver-
bal material presented in an accurate nested fashion had 
higher free recall than those who had seen inaccurate hier-
archies formed by randomly assigning category labels. Bow-
er et. al. concluded that if subjects encoded words by 
means of organizational structure and used that structure 
in recall, the ability to recall words was greatly enhanced. 
The ability to integrate information into single ideas 
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A conceptual hierarchy of words for the word 
"minerals" (Bower et. al., 1969) · 
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one can process. That is, the ability to integrate sev-
eral encodings, or bits of information at one level, such 
that they represent a single encoding or bit of information 
at a higher level, greatly increases processing capacity. 
The process of integrating several encodings into one is 
called chunking; the higher level units formed in this way 
are called chunks (Miller, 1956). The ability to chunk 
information greatly increases one's capacity for infor-
mation processing. Chunking cannot occur, however, with-
out familiarity with the incoming material and the chunk it-
self. Previous knowledge and information must be activated 
in order for chunking to take place (previous knowledge and 
information must be activated in order to integrate new 
information within that system). The extensive bulk of 
knowledge that is activated can impose a structure on seem-
ingly unrelated material once a match occurs between that 
incoming information and stored previous information (Sol-
so, 1979). 
The link between stored previous information and chunk-
ing was illustrated in an experiment by Bower and Spring-
ston (1970) in which subjects were read a letter sequence 
and later asked to recall those letters. In one condition 
the letters were presented to the subjects so that they 
formed no known group (such as, FB ... IPH ... DTW ... AIB ... M). 
In the other condition the letters were dictated to the sub-
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jects so that they did form well known groups (such as, 
FBI .. . PHD . .. TWA ... IBM). As expected, the letters presented 
in meaningful groups were recalled much more successfully 
than were the letters presented in random groups. 
The research reviewed in this section suggests that 
memory is structured in an organized way. The ability to 
recode information into higher levels of structure will 
greatly enhance processing capacity. It appears that a 
consequence of clustering and chunking is an organized sys-
tem in which processing capacity, and hence, memory span,· 
for information is greatly increased. 
Recall of concrete versus abstract stimuli. 
In an early study, Brener (1940) demonstrated that 
the memory span for concrete words is significantly greater 
than that for abstract words. Another study (Gorman, 1961) 
using recognition memory as the dependent measure, demon-
strated a similar superiority in short term retention scores 
for concrete over abstract stimuli. Paivo (1963) investig-
ated the learning of adjective-noun paired associates as a 
function of adjective-noun word order and noun abstractness. 
He found that the adjective-noun paired associates were 
most effectively learned when the noun in the pair was con-
crete. 
Dukes and Bastran (1966) studied the recall of con-
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crete and abstract words equated for meaningfulness. A 
list of ten abstract and ten concrete nouns were presented 
to subjects one at a time. Half of the abstract words were 
high in frequency and half were low. The concrete nouns 
were equated for frequency in a similar manner. Immediate 
free recall was tested. Again, significantly more concrete 
words were recalled than abstract words. There was no sig-
nificant effect for word frequency. 
Paiva, Yuille and Rogers (1969) have shown that the 
concreteness of stimuli is an important determinant of the 
difficulty of recall. Concrete words (for example, ele-
phant, grass, magazine, tomahawk) are more easily recalled 
than are abstract words (for example, history, anxiety, 
profession, vi~tue). The effect of concreteness appears 
to be due to the fact that concrete words arouse vivid men-
tal images while abstract words do not, and that imagery 
·makes learning easier. 
The original work on imagery was conducted in a paired 
associates learning context by Paiva, Yuille and Madigan 
(1968). A group of college students was asked to rate nouns 
for their capacity to arouse an image. The results con-
firmed the fact that some words were consistently considered 
more imaginal than others (elephant, orchestra, church ver-
sus contact, deed, virtue). The influence of imagery on 
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paired associate learning was examined (stimulus words were 
matched for frequency and meaningfulness). Subjects were 
given stimulus and response words of a paired associate that 
were either high or low in imagery. The results showed 
that recall was the greatest when both the stimulus and the 
response words were high in imagery, and recall was the 
poorest when both words were low in imagery. It was conclu-
ded that high imagery (concrete) words were easier to recall 
than low imagery (abstract) words. 
The influence of imagery on free recall has now been 
firmly established. Words high in imagery are much more 
successfully recalled than those low in imagery (Postman, 
1975). Richardson (1975a, 1975b) has shown that although 
concreteness is usually linked to imagery, within the cat-
egory of concrete words, some can be ranked high_in imagery, 
some low. In one of his experiments, in which the recall of 
concrete words either high or low in imagery was compared, 
it was found that there was no difference between imagery 
conditions thus, although concrete stimuli were also us-
ually high imagery stimuli, it is the concreteness that is 
the determinant of recall. 
In a very recent study, Christian, Bickley, Tarka and 
Clayton (1978) established norms for the recall of 900 En-
glish nouns. The probability of recall for each noun was 
correlated with the noun's imagery, concreteness, meaning-
fulness and frequency. This study again confirmed that 
concreteness is a potent predicter of recall. 
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RATIONALE FOR THE CURRENT STUDY 
It has been established that unattended information 
is occasionally processed. Most research dealing with this 
phenomena has utilized the auditory modality, probably due 
to the methodological conveniences associated with audition 
and selective attention (as was outlined in a previous 
section of this paper). Recently, a paradigm was designed 
which would permit well controlled investigations of pro-
cessing of unattended information utilizing the visual mod-
ality (Wolford & Morrison, 1980). This present series of 
studies was designed to utilize the visual modality, taking 
advantage of Wolford and Morrison's paradigm. 
The study by Wolford and Morrison was considered a 
visual analog of auditory selective attention paradigms. 
Results paralleled auditory selective attention results 
in that subjects were generally unaware of the unattended 
information (as was first found by Cherry in 195J), but 
were aware of their own name when that was present in the 
unattended information (as was first found by Moray in 1959) 
The goal of this series of investigations was to extend 
those findings. While there has been a great deal of work 
done with the auditory modality, very little has been done 
with the visual modality. It was hoped that additional sim-
ilarities would be found. 
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It seems that unattended auditory information is prob-
ably processed semantically. Studies conducted by Treisman 
(1960) and Gray and Wedderburn (1960) support this fact. 
Additional evidence for semantic processing comes from stud-
ies conducted by Lackner and Garrett (1972) and MacKay 
(1973). Subjects were presented ambiguous sentences to 
their attended ear and, simultaneously, information to 
their unattended ear which would disambiguate those sen-
tences. Subjects were later asked to paraphrase the sen-
tences or select a sentence that was close in meaning (to 
the presented sentence) from a set of alternatives. Al-
though subjects reproted no awareness or memory of the un-
attended information, that information significantly af-
fected the direction in which the attende~ sentences were 
disambiguated. The present set of studies investigated 
whether or not unattended visual information is processed 
semantically. Three studies were conducted which investi-
gated the clustering effect, the concrete superiority ef-
fect, and the Stroop interference effect. If, at the level 
of unattended information, the facilitative effects of clus-
tering, a superiority of recognition for concrete versus 
abstract words, or a Stroop interference effect could be 
demonstrated, semantic processing would be implied. 
Traditionally, there are two explanations which have 
been offered to account for processing of unattended in-
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formation. As described in a previous section, these two 
explanations are: 1) that some words have a very low rec-
ognition threshold and are thus recognized very easily, 
even without attention delegated to them, and 2) some in-
formation is so familiar and processing so practiced that 
such processing becomes automatic - the processing of highly 
familiar items is accomplished without attention. Both of 
these explanations adequately account for the processing of 
very familiar unattended information, such as one's own 
name. The low recognition threshold theory states that 
recognition thresholds for certain words may be temporarily 
lowered when the probability of occurance of a given word 
is high. This would account for processing which is clas-
sified as semantic in the case of Treisman's and Gray and 
Wedderburn's results. Neither theory would account for the 
semantic processing of the type described by Lackner and 
Garret (1972) and MacKay (197J), however, although it may 
be argued that their results were not as strong as implied. 
Newstead and Dennis (1979) presented evidence that MacKay's 
results held only under certain specific conditions. This 
series of studies was designed in order to investigate sem-
antic processing of unattended information in conditions 
which control for expectancy effects, or the probability 
of occurrance of given words, and which therefore cannot 
be accounted for with the current explanations. 
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Three studies were conducted using a paradigm similar 
to Wolford and Morrison's (1980): The unattended informa-
tion was presented foveally and the unattended stimulus 
was always the only verbal stimulus present (in order to 
avoid expectancies). Single words were flanked by two sin-
gle digits. The only word presented in each trial was 
the unattended word so that it would never be the case that 
recognition thresholds were temporarily lowered due to 
high probabilities of given words occurring (as was the case 
in Treisman's and Gray and Wedderburn's studies). 
The first experiment investigated the effect of clus-
tering on processing of unattended information. Previous 
research has shown that subjects are better able to recall 
words when they are from a consistent category or chunk 
(such as, animals or professions), than when they are un-
related. This effect was tested with unattended information. 
If the information were truly unattended and not processed, 
presenting words from a consistent category would not aid 
recall. If words were processed, specifically semantically 
processed, subjects would notice that the unattended infor-
mation is from a consistent category and thus, recall should 
be facilitated. Following the experimental tas~s (add the 
two single digits from a series of trials), subjects were 
given a surprise two alternative forced choice recognition 
test. If they were aware of the fact that the unattended 
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words were from one category or cluster (if they processed 
that information semantically), they should perform signif-
icantly better on the recognition test than if they were un-
aware of that fact (even if they did not remember specific 
words, awareness of the category of words would permit them 
to make "educated guesses"). 
If the unattended words were processed and subjects 
were aware of the word category, it would show a need to 
revise current explanations of unattended processing, as 
neither explanation described above can account for such an 
effect (the unattended words were not highly practiced 
or meaningful to the subjects, and.there was no attended 
information which would have lowered the recognition thres-
holds for such words). If subjects were not aware of the 
word categories it would strenghten current explanations as 
it would imply that unattended information is processed only 
when it is highly familiar and/or meaningful. 
The second experiment examined the effects of concrete 
versus abstract words at the level of unattended infor-
mation. Research has shown that, at the level of attended 
information, concrete words are much easier to recall than 
are abstract words. Subjects were presented with either 
concrete stimuli or abstract stimuli (again flanked by sin-
gle digits). Following the experimental task (adding the dig-
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its) subjects were given a surprise recognition test of 
the unattended information (the centered words). If that 
information were processed, concrete words should be remem-
bered more often than abstract words. The results of this 
study will again be used to measure the adequacy of current 
explanations of unattended processing. 
The final study in this series investigated Stroop 
type effects. Previous research has shown that if two dim-
ensions of a stimulus are present, one representing an at-
·tribute and one representing an attribute name, interference 
will occur when a subject is asked to respond to that at-
tribute and to ignore that attribute name, if those two dim-
ensions are conflicting (i.e., if the attribute and the at-
tribute name represent two different things). Using the 
same paradigm as in ~he previous two studie~. this effect 
was tested with unattended visual information. Subjects 
saw a word flanked by two single digits and were instructed 
to find the sum of the digits and to ignore the centered 
word. Sometimes the centered word was unrelated to the dig-
its, sometimes it was equal to the sum of the digits (in 
which case the attribute and the attribute name were con-
sistent), and sometimes it was a number that was equal to 
the sum of the digits, plus or minus one (in which case the 
attribute and the attribute name were inconsistent). Inter-
ference effects were tested by measuring response latencies 
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(the time the digits were presented to the subjects until 
the time they reported the sum). Recall of the centered 
words was later measured with a surprise two alternative 
forced choice recognition test, as in the previous studies. 
The types of words recalled (if any) would again suggest 
ways in which the stimuli were processed (if at all) and 
ways in which current explanations of unattended processing 
should be revised (if necessary). 
EXPERIMENT I 
Method 
Subjects. Sixty subjects participated in this exper-
iment. All subjects were enrolled as students at Loyola 
University of Chicago at either the graduate or the under-
graduate level. All subjects were screened for normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision using a Snellen eye chart. 
Design. There were five groups in this experiment. 
All groups received six blocks of twenty trials each. On 
each trial the stimulus consisted of two single digit num-
bers separated by five degrees of visual angle. All sub-
jects were instructed to add the two digits as quickly 
and as accurately as possi~le. In four conditions there 
was a word positioned between the two digits. Subjects in 
these conditions were instructed to ignore that centered 
word. After the sixth block of trials subjects were given 
a surprise two alternative force choice recognition test 
(for the appropriate four conditions). 
Condition 1 represented a control condition, in which 
subjects were simply asked to find the sum of the two sin-
gle digits, without the presence of a centered word. The 
centered words in Condition 2 were from one category of 
words. The words in Condition 3 were from two categories 
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(ten words from each category) and in Condition 4 were from 
four categories (five words from each category). Words in 
Condition 5 were unrelated semantically. 
There were 12 subjects in each condition. Response 
latencies were measured in all conditions Recall of the 
centered words was tested in Conditions 2-5. 
Apparatus and materials. Stimuli were presented to 
the subjects on a Scientific Prototype Tachistoscope, Mod-
el N-1000. An Erling Counter Timer Frequency Meter was in-
terfaced to the tachistoscope and used to measure reaction 
times. 
The ~timuli for all trials, for all conditions, were 
two single digit numbers positioned on a screen at a dis-
tance of approximately five degrees of visual angle. The 
digits that were used were selected randomly, with the con-
straint that the sum of the digits would be less than ten. 
In Conditions 2-5 there was a word centered between the two 
digits. Examples of stimuli with and without centered words 
are shown in Figure 8. For each word condition the stimuli 
were either from one category, from two categories, from 
four categories, or from no discernible category. Appro-
priate words and categories were chased from Cohen, Bous-
field and Whitmarch's Cultural Norms for Verbal Items (1957). 
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A. 5 1 
B. 6 WORD 2 
Figure 8. Examples of stimuli used in Experiment I. A. 
A stimulus item used in Condition 1. B. A 
stimulus item of the type used in Conditions 2-5. 
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For each word condition two sets of stimulus words were 
chosen such that one set could be used as stimulus (test) 
items and one set as foil items in a subsequent two alter-
native forced choice recognition test. All stimulus words 
used for each condition are shovm in Appendix A. 
Following all experimental trials was a surprise two 
alternative forced choice recognition test in which sub-
jects were asked to identify the centered words that they 
had seen. On this recognition test, stimulus (test) items 
were paired with foil items (the other set of stimulus 
words) matched for length and frequency (on the basis of 
Kucera and Francis' 1967 norms). In Condition 2, all stim-
ulus items were either articles of clothing or animals; 
one set of words was used as test items and one set as foil 
items. In Condition J, all stimulus items were either types 
of fruit and parts of the body or pieces of furniture and 
animals; one set of words was again used as test items and 
and one set was used as foil items. In Condition 4, all 
stimulus items were either metals, articles of clothing, 
parts of the body, and animals or types of fruit, modes of 
transportation, vegetables, and pieces of furniture; again 
one set of words was used as test items and one set as foil 
items. In Condition 5, two sets of words were selected 
which did not represent any discernible category; one set 
was used as test items and the other as foil items. In 
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each of the above conditions the set of words used as test 
items and the set used as foil items were counterbalanced 
across subjects. 
In order to avoid the possibility that subjects might 
not ignore the centered words on the first few trials, the 
first two blocks of trials utilized a list of 20 unrelated 
words, test items were not introduced until the third block 
of trials. All test items and foil items were randomly 
paired in the subsequent recognition test. The recognition 
tests used are shown in Appendix A, as are the initial 20 
words used in Blocks 1 and 2 for Conditions 2 - 5. 
Procedure. As a subject arrived he was tested for 
normal (20/20) vision using a Snellen eye chart. Assuming 
he had normal or corrected-to-norma~ vision (those who did 
not were not used as subjects), the experiment began. The 
subject sat in a dimly lighted room and viewed the tachis-
toscope screen binocularly. 
At the start of each session the subject was told 
that he would see two digits separated by a word (except 
in Condition 1). He was to initiate each trial by pushing 
a button in front of him. When he pushed the button he 
would see the two digits and the word (or just the two dig-
its in the case of Condition 1). His task was to add the 
digits as quickly as possible and to ignore the centered 
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word, if present. When the digits appeared on the screen 
a clock started, as soon as he knew the sum he was to push 
the button again, stopping the clock, and report the sum to 
the experimenter. It was further explained that the pur-
pose of the task was to see how quickly subjects were able 
to perform a simple task -(adding the digits) in the presence 
of interference (the centered word) which was why he was 
to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. He 
was told that his strategy should be to try to focus on 
the digits and ignore the centered word, if he started to 
read the centered word it would interfere and slow him 
down, and he should be trying to proceed as quickly as pos-
sible. Subjects in Condition 1 were told that the purpose 
was to see how quickly subjects could perform a simple 
task. When the subject initiated each trial a display ap-
peared following a 1000 msec foreperiod. Each display 
was presented for a duration of 50 msec. 
Each testing session was divided into six blocks of 
20 trials each. In Conditions 2-5 the first two blocks 
used an initial set of centered words (as these blocks 
were considered practice trials where subjects might not 
be adequately ignoring the centered words). Response lat-
encies for the first two blocks were not scored for any of 
the experimental conditions. The stimulus words of:interest 
(the test items) were introduced in the third block of 
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trials. Following all trials subjects were given a two 
alternative forced choice recognition test and asked to 
identify the centered words that they had seen (the words 
from Blocks 1 and 2 were not present). 
Results. 
An analysis of variance yielded no significant dif-
ferences between resnonse latencies for Blocks (F(J,165= 
~ -
0.461J, p>.05) or Conditions (f(4,55)=0.JJO, p~.05) and 
no significant Blocks by Conditions interaction (£12,165= 
0.04178, p~.05). Figure 9 shows the mean response latencies 
as a function of Blocks and Conditions. Performance did 
not improve with practice, as the experiment progressed 
from Blocks J through 6, reaction times did not change sig-
nificantly (as mentioned above, because Blocks 1 and 2 were 
considered practice trials, responses for those blocks 
were not scored. 
There was a significant difference b~tween conditions 
for words recalled on the subsequent recognition test 
(£(J,44)=J.2J, p<.05) as shown in Figure 10. Subjects re-
called more words when they were from consistent categories 
than when they were from no discernible category. 
Discussion. · 
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latencies across conditions. Subjects did not display a 
practice effect for the last four blocks of trials (the 
trials of interest) and did not show any difference in 
response times across conditions. Both of these results 
reflect a very improtant foundation for the rest of this 
discussion. Since no practice effects were shown, it can 
be assumed that the initial practice trials (Blocks 1 and 2) 
were of sufficient number and served to bring subjects up 
to an adequate level of performance at the onset of the ex-
perimental trials. The fact that there were no differences 
across subjects shows that subjects were performing at the 
same speed regardless of whether or not there was a centered 
word present in the displays they saw (Condition 1 versus 
Conditions 2-5) and regardless of any characteristics of 
those centered words (Conditions 2-5). If those centered 
words were being processed in any way, it was without any 
extra time alloted to that processing function. 
There was a significantly different number of words 
recalled on the subsequent recognition tests across con-
ditions. Subjects recalled the most words under Condition 
2 where all the test words were from the same category, and 
the least under Condition 5 where the test words were from 
no discernible category. As mentioned earlier, unless the 
subjects were processing the centered words semantically, 
they would never know that those words were of consistent 
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categories and thus, there should be no difference across 
category conditions. Since there was a difference, it 
must suggest that subjects were aware of the category factor 
and were processing the material semantically. 
It should be noted that one possible flaw in the design 
of this experiment is that subjects may have been able to 
correctly guess the appropriate words when tested in Con-
dition 2. Because the test words were all from the same 
category and because the recognition test consisted of 
words from that category and from one other, subjects might 
have guessed that the presented words were all from the 
same category. There appeared· to be no simple solution to 
this problem (it was decided that a recognition test was 
preferable to a recall test, and a recognition test where 
the foil items were all of different categories would have 
confounded the problem further), although it may indeed 
be a problem. It is suggested that this be born in mind 
when interpreting the results. It still appears that this 
effect is a strong one however; even if this condition is 
not considered, there is still a large difference between 
recognition rates for the other three conditions (although 
not quite significant). 
Contrary to expectations, the recognition rate for 
the centered words was above chance in all conditions. 
68 
Even in Condition 5 (where the centered words were from 
no discernible semantic category), subjects correctly i-
dentified an average of 1J.5 words on the subsequent recog-
nition test. If only chance was operating, which was ex-
pected as a result of previous studies, subjects would have 
correctly identified and average of 10 words. That rec-
ognition was above chance in all conditions implies that 
subjects processed the centered words in all conditions, 
at least to some minimal degree. 
EXPERIIVIENT II 
Method. 
Subjects. Forty eight subjects participated in this 
experiment. All subjects were enrolled as students at Loy-
ola University of Chicago at either the graduate or the un-
dergraduate level. All subjects were screened for normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision using a Snellen eye chart. 
Design. There were four groups in this experiment. 
All groups received six blocks of 20 trials each. The 
overall design of this experiment was similar to the pre-
vious one in that all subjects saw two digits positioned 
at a distance of 5° of visual angle (from each other). 
In three conditions there was a word positioned between 
the digits which the subjects were instructed to ignore. 
After the sixth block of trials, subjects were given a sur-
prise two alternative forced choice recognition test (for 
the appropriate conditions). 
Condition 1 represented a control condition. in which 
subjects were asked to compute the sum of the two digits, 
without the presence of a centered word. The centered words 
in Condition 2 were all concrete nouns. The words in Con-
dition J were abstract words, and the words in Condition 4 
were comprised of both concrete nouns and abstract words 
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(50% of each type). As in Experiment I, there were two 
sets of stimulus words selected for each condition such that 
one set was used as test items and one set was used as foil 
items in the subsequent recognition test (the use of words 
as test or foil items was counterbalanced across subjects). 
The stimulus words for each set (and each condition) were 
matched for length and frequency. 
There were 12 subjects in each condition. Both re-
sponse latencies and recall of the centered words were mea-
sured. 
Apparatus and materials. The apparatus and materials 
used were virtually th~~ame as in Experiment I. The only 
difference was that the stimulus words (test items and foil 
items) were changed. Initial stimulus words (those used 
in the first two blocks of trials), all subsequent stimulus 
words, and all subsequent recognition tests are shown in 
Appendix B. All stimulus items (test and foil items) were 
matched for length and frequency and randomly paired in 
the recognition test. 
Procedure. The procedure utilized was the same as in 
Experiment I. 
Results. 
An analysis of variance yielded no significant dif-
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ferences between response times across conditions (K(J,44)= 
0.914, p>.05) or across blocks (K(J,1J2)=0.1767, p~.os), 
nor a significant interaction effect for Blocks by Condit-
ions (f(9,1J2)=0.2259, p).05). Figure 11 shows the mean 
response latencies as a function of Block and Condition. 
It appears that response latencies did not change to a sig-
nificant degree as the experiment progressed from block to 
block, or between the different experimental conditions. 
An analysis of variance yielded no significant dif-
ference between the number of words recalled for each con-
dition (K(2,JJ)=1.009, p>.05). It should be noted, however, 
that although a significant difference was not found, more 
concrete words were recognized than abstract words, as 
shown in Figure 12 (recognition rates for the condition in 
which test items were ten concrete words and ten abstract 
words fell directly between the concrete only and the ab-
stract only conditions). The trend for recognition rates 
was in the predicted direction. 
Discussion. 
No differences in response latencies as a function 
of Block or Condition were found. These results suggest 
that no practice effects were exhibited (performance did 
rtot change as the experiment progressed from Block J 
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displays was the same regardless of the experimental con-
dition (processing time was the same when there was no cen-
tered word present, when the centered word was concrete, 
when the centered word was abstract, and when the centered 
words were either concrete or abstract). 
The lack of a difference between conditions for word 
recognition was surprising. It was predicted that concrete 
words would be remembered more successfully than abstract 
words and that recall for the condition which consisted of 
both concrete and abstract words would fall between the 
concrete only and abstract only recall rates. It should 
again be noted that the results were in the direction pre-
dicted, but that the differences were not large enough to 
reach significance. There are two possible explanations· 
for this result. 
First, the fact that the differences in this exper-
iment did not approach significance was probably due to 
the fact that the number of subjects participating in this 
experiment was relatively small. The fewer the number of 
measurements taken in an experiment, the greater the dif-
ferences must be in order to be considered significant. 
If the differences noted here remained consistent (thus, 
not due to chance) over a larger number of subjects they 
would have been considered significant. 
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Second, it was established in the first experiment 
that recognition memory for a list of 20 unrelated words 
was poor (although significantly greater than chance). In 
all conditions within the present experiment the word lists 
consisted of unrelated words. The weak effect exhibited in 
this experiment was probably due in part to a floor effect. 
The differences might have been larger if this floor effect 
had been avoided. One way in which this problem might be 
overcome in a future experiment would be to present words 
from consistent categories for all conditions. 
Moreover, as mentioned eariler, when selecting the 
stimulus items care was taken to select items that could 
be classified as either concrete or abstract and to match 
all test and foil items for frequency and length. In a 
future study, the effects suggested here might be strengh-
tened if the stimulus words were selected such that (in 
addition to the constraints mentioned above) the concrete 
words were highly concrete and the abstract words were very 
abstract (this could be done by checking the stimulus words 
against the Christian et.al. 1978 norms). 
EXPERIMENT III 
Method 
Subjects. Thirty six subjects participated in this 
experiment. All subjects were enrolled as students at Loy-
ola University of Chicago at either the graduate or the un-
dergraduate level. All subjects were again screened for 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision using a Snellen eye 
chart. 
Design. There were three groups in this experiment. 
All groups again received six blocks of 20 trials each. 
The overall design of this experiment was similar to that 
of the previous two experiments. Subjects saw similar types 
of stimuli under the same instructions. Condition 1 was a 
control condition in which subjects saw only digits with no 
centered words. Condition 2 was a condition similar to 
the above conditions in that the centered words were a 
set of unrelated nouns. Of the words in Condition J, 80% 
were unrelated nouns, 10% were words equal to the sum of 
the digits (for any particular trial), and 19% were words 
equal to one plus or minus the sum of the digits for any 
particular trial (half were equal to one plus the sum, half 
were equal to the sum minus one). As in the previous stu-
dies, for each word condition two sets of stimulus words 
were selected such that one set was used as test items and 
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one set as foil items in the subsequent recognition test 
(words used as test or foil items was counterbalanced ac-
ross subjects ) . 
Again, there were 12 subjects per condition. Re-
sponse latencies and recall of the centered words were 
measured. 
Apparatus and materials. The apparatus and materials 
used were virtually the same as in the previous exper-
iments. The only difference was that the stimulus words 
(test items and foil items) were changed. All stimulus 
items were again matched for length and frequency and ran-
domly paired in the recognition test. Initial stimulus 
words (those used in the first two blocks of trials for 
all word conditions), all subsequent stimulus words, and 
all subsequent recognition tests are shown in Appendix C. 
Procedure. The procedure utilized was the same as 
in Experiments I and II. 
Results 
An analysis of variance yielded no significant dif-
ferences between response latencies across blocks (£(J,99)= 
0.460J, p .05) or across conditions (£(2,JJ)=0.9247, p .05). 
There was no significant difference found for the Blocks 
by Conditions interaction (£(6,99)=0.1502, p .05). Fig-
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ure 1J shows the mean response latencies as a function of 
Block by Condition. It appears that reaction time to. the 
stimuli did not change to a significant degree as the ex-
periment progressed from block to block, or between the 
different experimental conditions. 
As it was felt that the Stroop type stimuli might 
alter the reaction times in Condition J, data for that 
condition was analyzed alone. Response latencies for the 
Stroop type stimuli where the attribute was the same as the 
attribute name (the centered number word was equal to the 
sum of the two flanking digits), and where the attribute 
was not equal to the attribute name (the centered number 
word was not equal to the sum of the flanking digits), 
and response latencies for non-Stroop type stimuli (the 
centered word was unrelated to the flanking digits) were 
compared. There were no significant differences found 
(£(2,JJ)=0.0928, p>.05). These results are shown in Fig-
ure 14. 
The mean number of words recognized for Conditions 
2 and J were compared. The results did not reach signif-
icance (!(22)=1.22, p>.05). It should be noted that more 
words were correctly recognized in Condition J (Stroop) 
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iviean resuonse latencies as a function of cloc~-: 
and condltion (Zxperiment 3). 
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Figure 15. Percentage of wares correctly recognize~ as a 
f~ction of condition. Condition 2 - ~nrelate~ 
words; Condition J - Stroop type sti2uli 
(Experiment J). 
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A further analysis was done on the number of words 
correctly recognized in Condition J. Words correctly rec-
ognized when they were consistent Stroop types, conflicting 
Stroop types, and unrelated to the flanking digits were 
compared. No significant differences were found (£(2,22)= 
1.942, p>.05). These results are shown in Figure 16. 
Discussion 
As in the previous two experiments, no differences in 
response latencies as a function of Blocks or Conditions 
were obtained. These results suggested that no practice 
effects were exhibited and that the time alloted to process 
the stimulus displays was the same regardless of the exper-
imental condition. 
It was very surprising that the Stroop type stimuli 
did not alter reaction times in Condition J, as this is 
contrary to the classical Stroop findings. There are two 
possible explanations for this. As mentioned in the pre-
vious literature review, it has been suggested that Stroop 
interference occurs when one process (usually reading a 
color word) is faster than another process (usually naming 
the color of the ink). In this case, the two processes 
examined were reading (the centered words) and adding (the 
flanking digits). In this case, it may be that the inter-























Figure 16. Percentage of words correctly reco~nized as 
a function of the category of the ~entered 
words (Experiment J; Condition J). 
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than adding (at least under these conditions, when the sum 
of the two digits was always less than ten). 
In classical Stroop studies, subjects view a number 
of Stroop type stimuli in succession and identify the in-
structed attribute of those stimuli. In this experiment, 
only 20% of all stimuli could be classified as Stroop type, 
with only 10% conflicting Stroop stimuli. This was due to 
the fact that a subsequent surprise recognition test was 
used to test subjects' recall of the centered words. Ob-
viously, only a few numbers could have been used or it 
would have rendered the test invalid. It may be that, 
because only a small proportion of the stimuli were act-
ually Stroop stimuli, subjects became more practiced at not 
alloting time to that interfering attribute (since it only 
actually conflicted once in a while) than they do under a 
more traditional Stroop paradigm. 
No significant differences between the number of words 
correctly recognized for Conditions 2 and J were found. It 
was expected that more words would have been recalled in 
Condition J, as the Stroop stimuli were expected to be more 
meaningful to the subjects than the unrelated words. This 
trend was evident (more words were recalled in Condition 
J), but the differences were not large enough to be con-
sidered significant. As mentioned pDeviously, this lack 
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of significance was probably due, in part, to the rel-
atively small number of subjects participating in this ex-
periment. 
Moreover, if the centered words were changed so that 
there was not such a poor overall recognition rate, the 
expected differences might be apparent. It is expected 
that if this floor effect were avoided, more words would 
have been recognized under the Stroop condition than under 
the unrelated words condition. Within the Stroop condition, 
it would be expected that the conflicting Stroop-type stim-
uli would be recognized the most successfully, followed 
by the non-conflicting Stroop type and the unrelated words. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This series of studies was designed in order to see 
if visual selective attention was similar to auditory sel-
ective attention, if and when unattended information is 
"processed", what type of processing occurs at the level 
of unattended information, and finally, to evaluate the 
adequacy of two unattended processing explanations. 
Perhaps the most consistent and striking finding in 
this research was the fact that response latencies did 
not change to a significant degree across all conditions 
in all experiments. Subjects completed the experimental 
task (adding the digits) at the same speed regardless of 
whether or not there was a word present between those dig-
its and regardless of whether or not those centered words 
(across trials) were of the same category, were of dif-
ferent categories, were concrete, were abstract, or were 
Stroop type stimuli. It has previously been assumed that 
if no additional time was alloted to additional stimuli 
(RT without versus RT with centered words), those additional 
stimuli were not being attended to and were not being pro-
cessed. 
Shiffrin and Gardner (1972) have shown that, at least 
in the initial stages of visual processing, processing 
takes place without capacity limitations and without at-
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tentional control. In a letter detection task it was found 
that subjects were performing with equal success when they 
were asked to detect letters from a set of four letters 
displayed simultaneously and when asked to cetect them 
from a series of four letters displayed sequentially. That 
response latencies did not change in the present experiments 
with or without the presence of a centered word does not 
necessarily imply anything about processing those words 
(bearing Shiffrin and Gardner's results in mind). The fact 
that no additional time was used to process the presented 
information does not necessarily reflect the fact that no 
additional processing occured. 
Another common assumption when dealing with "unat-
t~nded information" is that if subjects do not remember the 
presented informa~ion, it was not process~d. It is easy 
to see how this assumption came about. Although it might 
be hard to imagine not seeing the centered words, after com-
pleting a series of trials of the type used in this exper-
iment, subjects seem to become unaware of those words. For 
the first few trials the centered word is clearly seen be-
tween the two digits, but after a while the digits are fo-
cused on and the word is really not consciously attended to. 
Anyone who questions this should view a few trials of this 
type himself. After viewing a few trials, most people are 
quite certain that the centered words are not processed. 
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Following all trials, subjects were given a surprise 
recognition test. Judging from- their reactions and comments 
this test was really a surprise, and to expect them to rec-
ognize words they never "saw" was about as reasonable as 
asking them to predict what words they would see before the 
start of the experiment. Subjects did not think they 
saw the words and felt quite certain that they could not 
recognize the words. Based on the subjects' reactions 
one would almost certainly assume that the words were never 
processed. On the basis of the results of this series of 
studies, however, this appears to be a faulty assumption. 
Recognition memory was better than subjects thought 
it would be. While many subjects swore they had no idea 
what words were being presented, and that they were ran-
domly indicating words in the subsequent recognition test, 
performance in all cases was better than chance (although 
only slightly). Moreover, even when subjects could not 
remember the words that were presented, this does not nec-
essarily imply that they did not process those words. In 
previous studies the unattended information was always ran-
dom and irrelevant to the experimental task, except in the 
cases where the unattended information was the subject's 
name, when it disambiguated the shadowed message, or when 
it completed a sentance started in the shadowed char~el -
and in all of these cases the unattended information was 
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remembered! The fact that subjects did not retain con-
tentless, irrelevant messages does not prove that they were 
completely unaware of them. 
Under several conditions within this present series 
of studies the centered words were chosen such that they 
would be easier to remember than under other conditions 
(i.e. words of consistent categories versus no categories; 
concrete words versus abstract words). When words were 
selected that were easy to remember (i.e. words that were 
chunked into one category), subjects performed significantly 
better on the subsequant recognition test than they did 
when words were selected that could not be remembered as 
easily. The lack of significance amoung other conditions 
may be attributed to floor effects (due to the difficulty 
of remembering the stimulus words). It does not seem at 
all logical to assume that under some conditions the cen-
tered words were processed and under some conditions they 
were not when the same experimental procedure was used ac-
ross all conditions. What is logical to assume however, 
is the fact that under some conditions the centered words 
were remembered more successfully than under other condit-
ions. This differential recognition effect reflects the 
ease of recall of the centered words between conditions, 
it does not reflect a differential processing rate between 
conditions. 
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An assumption prevalent in the Stroop literature is 
that subjects cannot "turn off" the processing of highly 
familiar information even if they want to, and that this 
processing interferes with the processing of other infor-
mation. This assumption has been formed on the basis of 
the interference effect of one attribute on the processing 
of another attribute of the stimuli being processed (when 
the attributes are of the same response class but repre-
sent conflicting attributes). This interference effect is 
very robust and has been shown in almost all Stroop stud-
ies. In all of those Stroop studies subjects are asked 
t~ respond to a long series of stimuli, all of which con-
tain a conflict between the attributes. In the present 
experiment, Stroop type stimuli were only 20% of the total 
number of stimuli presented to the subjects (due to other 
experimental constraints). The interference effect was 
not exhibited. It seems that in an experiment in which 
conflicting attributes were rarely present (attributes rep-
resented the same response class for 20% of the trials -
10% were consistent and 10% were conflicting) subjects 
were able to "turn off" the interference effect of pro-
cessing those attributes. When conflicting attributes 
rarely occurred subjects were able to train themselves to 
allot an equal amount of time to monitering those attributes 
as they did to moniter all other stimulus attributes. 
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On the basis of the results of this series of studies, 
it is believed that "unattended" visual processing is sim-
ilar to "unattended" auditory processing. It seems that 
unattended (peripheral) information is processed even 
when it is not highly meaningful or highly familiar to the 
subjects. The critical distinction seems to be between the 
PROCESSING of unattended information and the later RECOG-
NITION of unattended information. It appears that un-
attended messages are processed, specifically semantically 
processed (with both auditory and visual stimuli), but un-
less those messages are meaningful or relevant to the sub-
ject or his experimental task, they aren't remembered (or 
at least not sufficiently for accurate recognition). 
In the case in which a subject's name is presented, he 
remembers it because it is so meaningful to him. In the 
case of the presentation of a series of unrelated words, 
irrelevant both to the subject personally and to the task 
at hand, subjects would not be expected to retain that in-
formation. When unattended information is presented that 
is irrelevant but is very simple to remember (such as a 
series of types of fruit), subjects can be expected tore-
tain that information without effort, at least temporarily. 
Again, it cannot be assumed that because information 
is not remembered it was not processed. Processing of in-
formation and the subsequent recognition of information are 
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very distinct processes which sometimes, but do notal-
ways go together. The explanations of processing unattended 
information discussed earlier account very nicely for the 
processed unattended information which is usually retained 
and recognized: Information which is very meaningful to 
the subjects. They do not account for information that is 
not necessarilly meaningful but is very easily retained 
and they do not even come close to accounting for all the 
unattended information which is processed but not re-
tained. 
It appears that only slight modifications of current 
explanations are needed to account for all unattended in-
formation that is retained. A model that accounts for all 
the unattended information that is processed, however, must 
be much more complex, much more sophisticated, and much 
more sensitive than any of the gross processing models 
suggested to date. 
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 2 






















RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 2 
In each of the following items there is one word which was 
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was 
not. Please circle the word which was present. 
1 . co~·JN DOG 
2. TIE GOA'T 
3. BEAR GlOVES 
4. IAr~:E SHORTS 
5. 30Ch.S DI::ER 
6. CAP TIGER 
7. SCARF CAT 
8 . EL2PlLI\NT Sl" .. IRT 
9· JE:.l\I\:s BUll 
10. OVERCOAT Iv.OUS.S 
11. SLACKS FOX 
12. COAT v'JOLF 
1J. LION SHOES 
14. CO':J BELrr 
15. I·.,ONr(EY 'IOFCOA'T 
16. ?IG StrfEATER 
17. FONY JACL-..ZT 
18. SHIRT RAEEIT 
19. SH;;E? FAl{TS 
20. E=::AVZR BLOUSE 
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION J 






















RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 3 
In each of the following items there is one word which was 
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was 
not. Please circle the word which was present. 
1 . TIGER LElV~OI\f 
2 . RUG 1,1JrtiST 
J. LIP COUCE 
4. E2AR LI~VE 
5 . :_:LUTI~ PIG 
6 STOOL TOE 
7 . CHERRY j_JIANO 
8 . TOO'I'H I'.lOU3E 
9. EAi,~Ai'~A LAi··~=i· 
10 . BUFFET TEROAT 
11 . DEER 3AR. 
12 . ELBQi.·J 3ZNCH 
13 . :;·JOLF AJ?FLE 
14. RIES r .. UL.2 
15 . FEAR rCX 
16 . ?IG 3rr'01f2 
17 . CO'iJ AI';~~L~ 
18 . SOFA ?EACE 
19 . ~(~I\EE l\':ONro..SY 
20 . ROCr(ER ORP.NC:.E 
105 
TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 4 






















RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 4 
In each of the following items there is one word which was 
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was 
not. Please circle the word which was present. 
1. CABBAGE LIP 
2. JEEP FOX 
J. SUBWAY SKIRT 
4. BRASS PENS 
5. TAXI ELBOW 
6. DEER COUCH 
7. BEANS JEANS 
8. BULL STOOL 
9. ZINC POTATO 
10. LAMP TIRE 
. 11. MONKEY PEACH 
12. BRONZE STOVE 
1J. RIBS JET 
14. PEPPER COPPER 
15. WRIST RUG 
16. LIME TIN 
17. SLACKS SAILBOAT 
18. TEETH ORANGE 
19. APPLE SWEATER 
20. LEMON LION 
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 5 






















RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 5 
In each of the following items there is one word which was 
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was 
not. Please circle the word which was present. 
1. BEE CALF 
2 . 1;.JIRES GlOBE 
J. BEDS Fur~P 
4. ATLAS COUCH 
5 . BABIES SH.c;LF 
6. DOT CLIFF 
'7 
. SilK OF.GAN I 
8 . ASE LIL1lE 
9. LEAF 1.'10\;'j 
10. !-INT BRONZE 
11. DRU~·~ JUICE 
12. SODiur,; DOLLS 
1J. RIB TANr~ 
14. TUB BUBBLE 
15. TOURIST SAIL 
16. CEI'::Ef~ 'I' DENTL37' 
17. TIN ST~RJO 
18. R"·'""' Ul..; STR~ET 
19. BLADE I.:AP 
























TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 2 






















RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 2 
In each of the following items there is one word which was 
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was 
not. Please circle the word which was present. 
1. ATlAS GROVE 
2. BABBlES CO?P3R 
3. ARCH BEDS 
4. COiv1PASS DENTIST 
c:: LEAF' BOOT 
.-1 • 
6 . ORGAN lE.tlER 
..... CURB SAil ( . 
8 . RABBIT SODIUl<i 
9· TAI,\K RA1·2 
10. OAK TIN 
11. DEE PIT 
12. EROl,~Z1:: FEPPEE 
1J. NAilS CLIFF 
14. DRUk CCJ:~E 
15. SEATS FERRY 
16 . JIIRES \.rzy,:rJs 
17. TUi3 HUT 
18 . FI~ SUNf,IY 
19. lif·-'~E FA'I'HS 
20. ~lAP CAKE 
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 3 






















RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION J 
In each of the following items there is one word which was 
present in the dis-plays you just saw and one word which was 
not. Please circle the word which was present. 
1 . AFFIRI'·: TON 
2 . CEAS3D AT3 
J . GRIZF COUNTS 
4. 1-iOTING DEAF 
~ . n2RS D~S"SR\!:2 
../ 
6 . DIES HUFF 
7 . :au1~\. DU<LY 
8 . SORE EAT:2:N 
9 . FR.2ED SARN 
10 ~.~~ ....... EAF:.SH . \:; Li!tl:..~ 
11 . H.-, PLY An:s 
12 . 1TE.2?1T IROrY 
13 'ii1-iV h~EF:GE . ..L. 1 ... ..1. 
14. R~IY COi'J·:iiT 
• 
,.., OI'JNS O'·IF .i.] . .. ~
16 . .FE~ 1IJAPJ'r 
17 . Aiv~:!?lZ SHY 
18 NULL RIS:::N 
10 / . ~G-t) LEASE 
20 COiiFIRL r\ ;-,ifl . ..tl.:· ..1.. 
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 4 






















RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 4 
In each of the following items there is one word which was 
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was 
not. Please circle the word which was present. 
1. TOURIST CONFIRN 
2. EGO DENTIST 
J. NULl RIS~N 
4. SHELF AI'•1Pl:5: 
5· 'vvARN SAIL 
6. OV'JNS OVJE 
7. ORGAN SILK 
8. THY r11ERGE 
9· IRONY THE:FT 
10. BEE II(PLY 
11. TIN ASH 
12. DOT SARN 
1J. EATEN CliFF 
14. BULK GHOST 
15. FERRY JUIC.C:: 
16. DES~RVE HERS 
17. DEAF ~-~JIR~S 
18. STREET GlOBE 
19. 1'ilAP BlADE 
























TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 2 






















RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 2 
In each of the following items there is one word which was 
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was 
not. Please circle the word which was present. 
1. RIE CAKE 
2. PINT PATHS 
J. HAKE BLAD:2: 
4. RUG OAK 
5 . RABBIT GLOBE 
6. JUICE HUT 
?. PUifJP CURB 
8 . GHOST LEV:2R 
9. CO!vi?ASS CEMENT 
10. DOT VENUS 
11. SEATS ASH 
12. ARCH CALF 
1J. STEREO PIT 
14. F·EPPER C:TT ~ .. -;....) .J....a.....•~ 
15. SHELF COPPER 
16. I'; AILS COUCH 
17. BUBBLE G RO\lE 
18. £-IE :COILS 
19. BOOT TOURIST 
20. PLO'iJ CONE 
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 3 






















RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 3 
In each of the following items there is one word which was 
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was 
not. Please circle the word which was present. 
1. ~:.:EPPER COUCH 
2. CALF COl'hFASS 
3. RAKE 1' ~-r-\j\T 1"T"...,. ''1:!.•• u:::, 
4. CEKENT fii'~T 
5. }IE: pnrrp ·,) u ... ~ 
6. ONE BUBBLE 
7· CONE T~·JO 
8. RABBIT COl'P]R 
9· ·-t .....,._. ~ - ... 7\ .. ~~~; ~1, r~AILS 
10. ?OTATO TEN 
11. RIB GR.01·iE 
12. NINE SIX 
1J. CAKE BOOT 
14. l-'LOW GlOBE 
15. JUIC.2 CURE 
16. BLAJE ARCH 
17. S.SATS 'I'OURIST 
18. STEREO OA:i\. 
19. SILK THREE 
20. PIT 1:-'Uiv:P 
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